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THE WISCONSIN MARITAL PROPERTY ACT:
SECTIONS IN NEED OF REFORM
I. INTRODUC'ION
The institution of property is the embodiment of accidents,
events, and the wisdom of the past. It is before us as clay into
which we can introduce the coloration and configuration repre-
senting our wisdom. How great, how useful this new ingredient
may be will largely determine the future happiness, and perhaps
the continued existence of our society.'
The Wisconsin Marital Property Act (WMPA) went into effect on
January 1, 1986.2 Wisconsin was the first (and is still the only) state to
adopt a version of the Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA).'
However, Wisconsin did not adopt the exact version of the UMPA
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1983.' Wisconsin not only added sections but also
redrafted and amended certain sections of the UMPA.5 The provisions
of the WMPA affect all married couples, unless they choose to alter
these provisions, as permitted by Wisconsin Statutes section 766.58,
through a marital property agreement.6
Before Wisconsin adopted its community property system, it
recognized a need for reform concerning divorce and marriage issues and
therefore enacted divorce reform legislation in 1977.7  "The new
statutory rules governing property division at divorce ignored title-based
ownership and incorporated concepts of contribution based upon the
principle of marriage as a partnership."8 This set the stage for the
Wisconsin legislature to begin its consideration, and possible reform, of
1. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY AcT prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 97 (1987), reprinted in
21 Hous. L. REV. 601, 603 (1984) (quoting RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY (P. Rohan 4th ed. 1977)).
2. Howard S. Erlanger & June M. Weisberger, From Common Law Property To
Community Property: Wisconsin's Marital Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 Wis. L. REV.
769, 769 n.1.
3. Id. at 770. Wisconsin is one of nine community property states, along with Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, and Washington. Id. at 770 n.5.
4. ld. at 770 n.5.
5. Id.
6. See Wis. STAT. § 766.58 (1993-94). See generally June M. Weisberger & Michael W.
Wilcox, A Brief Overview: The New Wisconsin Marital Property Act, WiS. B. BULL., July 1984,
at 10.
7. Erlanger & Weisberger, supra note 2, at 771.
8. Id. See Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1993-94) (property division).
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rights during marriage and at death.9
The drafters of the UMPA recognized the equally important
contributions made by men and women during the course of a mar-
riage."l "[D]uring marriage each spouse should have a legally defined
and substantial right in the earnings of the other spouse and in the real
and personal property acquired as a result of such earnings, as well as in
the management of such earnings and property."" This right should
outlive the marriage and retain legal recognition despite termination of
the marriage by death, annulment, or divorce. 2 "This policy should be
appropriately implemented by legislation which would safeguard either
spouse against improper alienation of property by the other."' 3
This Comment will show that in drafting the WMPA the legislators
implemented sections which, in certain circumstances, do not adequately
safeguard a spouse against improper alienation of property by the other
spouse. Part II will compare certain management and control and
creditors' rights sections of the WMPA with the UMPA in order to show
the extent to which Wisconsin's version is different and in need of
reform. Part III will compare these same WMPA statutes with the
applicable Arizona community property statutes, which employ the
joinder requirements that Wisconsin should institute for certain
obligations. Part III will further illustrate the need for reform of certain
subsections of the WMPA.
II. SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE WMPA AND THE
UMPA
A. Uniform Marital Property Act Section 8
Section 8 of the Uniform Marital Property Act states: "After the
determination date ... an obligation incurred by a spouse in the interest
of the marriage or the family may be satisfied only from all marital
property and all other property of that spouse that is not marital
9. Erlanger & Weisberger, supra note 2, at 772.
10. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 97 (1987), reprinted in
21 Hous. L. REv. 601, 603 (1984).
11. Id. (quoting Report of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights to the President's
Commission on the Status of Women (1963)).
12. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 97 (1987), reprinted in
21 Hous. L. REv. 601, 603 (1984).
13. Id. at 603-04 (quoting Report of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights to the
President's Commission on the Status of Women (1963)).
[Vol. 79:859
WISCONSIN MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
property ...."" The historical notes following Section 8 state that this
section builds on a doctrine which has been developed and followed in
Arizona, Washington, and Louisiana. 5
The doctrine in this subsection is referred to as the "family purpose"
doctrine and covers obligations incurred during the marriage.16 This
doctrine bifurcates those obligations relating to the marriage, family, or
community from those obligations relating to the purely personal
purposes of the incurring spouse.17 However, a presumption exists that
"[a]n obligation incurred by a spouse during marriage is... incurred in
the interest of the marriage or the family."'"
The historical notes of the UMPA explicitly mention Arizona
Statutes section 25-215 in its discussion of this doctrine."9 However,
unlike section 25-215 of the Arizona Statutes, section 8 of the UMPA
places no limits on the ways in which one spouse can bind the marital
community in the interests of the family or the marriage."0 Arizona
also allows either spouse to incur obligations for the family or the
marriage that can be satisfied from the community property. However,
Arizona requires joinder of both spouses for certain transactions such as
a guaranty or a suretyship.2' Thus, Arizona does not allow unilateral
decision making in certain transactions, whereas the UMPA allows
unilateral decision making in any type of transaction as long as it is an
obligation incurred in the interest of the family or the marriage.
This practice of allowing unilateral decision making can lead to
disastrous results. For example, one spouse can incur huge debts in the
interest of the family or the marriage without the other spouse's consent
or knowledge and cause the entire marital community to be liable. The
end result can often be marital disharmony. One may argue that the
14. UNIt. MARITAL PROPERTY AcT § 8(b)(ii), 9A U.L.A. 117 (1987) [hereinafter
UMPA].
The basic premise of the U.M.P.A. is that spouses should be given vested rights of
joint and equal ownership in all property acquired after the "determination
date"-that is, either marriage, the coming into effect of the Act, or the founding of
domicile in the enacting state, whichever is later.
Patrick N. Parkinson, Who Needs The Uniform Marital Property Act?, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 677,
678 (1987) (citing UMPA § 1(5)).
15. UMPA § 8 cmt.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See UMPA § 8.
21. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-214 to -215 (1995).
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other spouse's objection to the loan transaction and refusal to consent
will also lead to disharmony. At least in that instance, however, the
obligation cannot be satisfied with the nonconsenting spouse's share of
the marital property. Furthermore, upon discussion of the proposed
transaction, the couple might compromise or decide that the transaction
is not in their best interests, thereby actually avoiding marital disharmo-
ny.
Section 8 of the UMPA does not allow any provision of a marital
property agreement to adversely affect a creditor's interests "unless the
creditor had actual knowledge of that provision when the obligation to
that creditor was incurred."'  While this provision is meritorious, it
illustrates that the creditor's rights are protected under this section, but
the rights of the spouse who does not incur the marital obligation are left
unprotected.
B. Wisconsin Marital Property Act Section 766.55
The WMPA significantly alters and clarifies the UMPA by guarantee-
ing spouses equal access to credit in Wisconsin Statutes sections
766.51(lm) and 766.56(1).' Prior to the adoption of the WMPA,
lenders used a title-based system of property ownership to make credit
determinations.24 Under a title-based approach, married applicants did
not have equal access to credit because a homemaker or lower wage-
earning spouse usually did not have adequate income and assets to be
deemed creditworthy.' Under WMPA, spouses have equal access to
credit and equal management and control, which allows a spouse to act
unilaterally (regardless of the name of the title-holder) in the interest of
the marriage or the family with the exception of:
marital property interest in (1) a partnership in which the other
spouse is a general partner; (2) a professional corporation,
professional association, or similar entity held by the other spouse
as a stockholder or member; (3) an asset of an unincorporated
business if the other spouse is the only one of the spouses
involved in operating or managing the business; or (4) an interest
22. UMPA § 8(e). "The effect of this subsection may not be varied by a marital
property agreement." Id.
23. Wis. STAT. §§ 766.51(lm), 766.56(1) (1993-94). See also Weisberger & Wilcox, supra
note 6, at 10, 101.
24. June M. Weisberger & H. Arleen Wolek, WMPA & Credit: Key Changes for
Creditors, Wis. LAW., Apr. 1989, at 18, 18.
25. Id.
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in a privately held corporation if the other spouse is an employee
of the corporation.26
Similar to UMPA section 8(b)(ii), Wisconsin Statutes section 766.55
states: "After the determination date... [a]n obligation incurred by a
spouse in the interest of the marriage or the family may be satisfied only
from all marital property and all other property of the incurring
spouse."'27 This section also contains a rebuttable presumption regard-
ing obligations. "An obligation incurred by a spouse during marriage,
including one attributable to an act or omission during marriage, is
presumed to be incurred in the interest of the marriage or the family."'
However, the Wisconsin legislature added a clause regarding
statements of purpose to this section:
A statement separately signed by the obligated or incurring
spouse at or before the time the obligation is incurred stating that
the obligation is or will be incurred in the interest of the marriage
or the family is conclusive evidence that the obligation to which
the statement refers is an obligation in the interest of the
marriage or family, except that the existence of that statement
does not affect any interspousal right or remedy.
29
This statement exists to clarify, for the spouses and the creditor, the
nature of the incurred obligation and to "enhance certainty regarding
what property is available to satisfy the obligation."'3  The UMPA does
not contain such a statement3' for a sound reason. Allowing a unilater-
ally signed statement to be conclusive evidence, rather than a rebuttable
presumption, that an obligation is or will be incurred in the interest of
the marriage or the family is a dangerous practice. "[I]f a married
applicant signs a separate statement that the obligation is being incurred
in the interest of the marriage or family, the creditor has conclusive or
irrebuttable evidence of a family purpose obligation."'32 Although the
existence of the statement does not affect any interspousal right or
26. Lynn Adelman et al., Departures from the Uniform Marital Property Act Contained
in the Wisconsin Marital Property Act, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 390,394 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
See Wis. STAT. § 766.70(3)(a)-(e) (1993-94).
27. WiS. STAT. § 766.55(2)(b) (1993-94).
28. Id. § 766.55(1). See UMPA § 8(a), which contains this same provision.
29. Wis. STAT. § 766.55(1) (1993-94). The WMPA deals with premarital agreements and
the interests of creditors in a similar manner to the UMPA. See Wis. STAT. § 766.55(4m);
UMPA § 8(e), at 118.
30. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.55 note (West 1995) (Legislative Council Committee
Supplemental Notes Relating to 1985 Act 37).
31. See UMPA § 8(a).
32. Weisberger & Wolek, supra note 24, at 18, 72.
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remedy,33 these rights and remedies are inadequate because a spouse
can unilaterally and detrimentally bind the marital community long
before a remedy becomes available or possible. For example, Wisconsin
Statutes section 766.70 states: "A spouse has a claim against the other
spouse for a breach of the duty of good faith imposed by [section] 766.15
resulting in damage to the claimant spouse's property."34 It is difficult
to see how this remedy will be adequate for the claimant spouse if the
marital community goes bankrupt as a result of the incurring spouse's
breach or gross mismanagement.
Wisconsin Statutes section 766.55(1) allows one spouse acting
unilaterally to bind the marital community for an obligation as long as
the spouse alleges that the obligation is incurred in the interest of the
marriage or the family.3" Section 766.51 of the Wisconsin statutes
(pertaining to management and control of spousal property) states:
"Notwithstanding any provision in this section except par. (b), for the
purpose of obtaining an extension of credit for an obligation described
under s. 766.55(2)(b), a spouse acting alone may manage and control all
of the marital property."36  The UMPA does not contain such a
provision.37
The legislative council notes for section 766.51 state that this
"[c]larifies the special exception to the marital property management and
control rules when a spouse is seeking an extension of credit."38 The
council notes further state:
The revised language clarifies: (1) that the provision on manage-
ment and control of marital property for credit purposes only
applies to obligations incurred in the interest of the marriage or
the family [i.e., those obligations described in s. 766.55(2)(b)]; and
(2) that the management and control right under the provision
extends only to obtaining unsecured credit and to extensions of
33. See WIS. STAT. § 766.70 (1993-94).
34. Id. § 766.70(1).
35. See Park Bank-West v. Mueller, 151 Wis. 2d 476, 444 N.W.2d 754 (Ct. App. 1989).
36. WiS. STAT. § 766.51(lm)(a) (1993-94). Paragraph (b) states:
Unless the spouse acting alone may otherwise under this section manage and control
the property, the right to manage and control marital property under this subsection
does not include the right to manage and control marital property described in s.
766.70(3)(a) to (d) or the right to assign, create a security interest in, mortgage or
otherwise encumber marital property.
Id. § 766.51(lm)(b).
37. See UMPA § 5.
38. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.51 historical notes (West 1995) (1993 Main Volume
Legislative Council Notes-1985 Act 37, §§ 84 to 87).
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credit secured by purchase money security interests. The
language permits a spouse to grant a purchase money security
interest because, in most transactions, the property purchased will
either be nontitled property or property titled in the name of the
purchasing spouse.
Therefore, this section allows either spouse to make purchases
unilaterally while subjecting the marital community to liability. For
example, as long as a family purpose statement is included, one spouse
can go to a bank and take out a credit card application or a loan to buy
furniture without the other spouse's signature on the loan.4 Further-
more, making the statement of marital or family purpose conclusive can
lead to marital disharmony because it may require spouses to sue one
another while they are still married. It makes more sense to require
joinder" of the spouses before certain obligations, such as guaranties,
are incurred in the interest of the marriage or the family.
The only requirement written into the Wisconsin Statutes is that the
creditor must give notice to the nonincurring spouse.42 Section 766.56-
(3)(b) provides:
Except as provided in par. (c), if a creditor extends credit to a
spouse in a credit transaction governed by chs. 421 to 427 and the
extension of credit may result in an obligation described under s.
766.55(2)(b), the creditor shall give the nonapplicant spouse
written notice of the extension of credit before any payment is
due. The notice requirement may be satisfied by providing a"
copy of the instrument, document, agreement or contract
evidencing the obligation to pay or any required credit disclosure
which is given to the applicant spouse, or by providing a separate
writing briefly describing the nature of the credit extended.
Notice is considered given on the date it is mailed to the address
of the nonapplicant spouse provided to the creditor by the ap-
plicant spouse. If the applicant spouse informs the creditor that
39. Id.
40. The practice of some banks is to try to obtain the signatures of both spouses if
possible.
41. Joinder is defined as: "The consent to an agreement or document by a party who
has an interest in the subject matter of the agreement or document, but who is not himself an
active party to the agreement or document." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 836 (6th ed. 1990).
42. See Park Bank-West v. Mueller, 151 Wis. 2d 476,478-79 & n.1,444 N.W.2d 754,756
& n.1 (Ct. App. 1989).
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the spouses reside at the same address, the notice may be
enclosed in an envelope addressed to the nonapplicant spouse or
both spouses.a3
However, the penalty for failure to give notice is nominal. Section
766.56 states that "[e]xcept as provided in par. (c), a creditor that fails
to give notice under sub. (2)(b) is liable to each applicant spouse in the
amount of $25." 4 In Park Bank-West v. Mueller, the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals held that notwithstanding the bank's failure to give notice to
the nonapplicant spouse, the loan was still recoverable against the
marital community, as well as against the applicant spouse's individual
property.a5
Park Bank-West involved a loan that was an unsecured consumer
credit transaction, which is governed by the Wisconsin Consumer Act,
chapters 421 to 427 of the Wisconsin Statutes.4' The husband borrowed
$25,000 from the bank for home improvement and signed a statement
claiming that the obligation was being incurred in the interest of the
marriage or the family.4 7 Since the obligation was incurred in the
interest of the marriage or the family, it fell under Wisconsin Statutes
section 766.55(2)(b). Therefore, the creditor was required to give written
notice of the extension of credit to the nonapplicant spouse before any
payment came due on the loan. 8
In this case, the bank conceded that it did not give the required
written notice, pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 766.56(3)(b), to the
nonapplicant spouse.49 The court noted that the purpose of the notice
requirement was to inform the nonapplicant spouse of the family
43. WIS. STAT. § 766.56(3)(b) (1993-94). Paragraph (c) states that "[n]otice is considered
given under par. (b) if the nonapplicant spouse has actual knowledge that the credit is
extended or waives the notice requirement in a signed writing." Id. § 766.56(3)(c). The
UMPA does not contain either of these provisions because it does not have a section dealing
with credit transactions with married persons like Wisconsin Statutes section 766.56. See
UMPA §§ 1-20, at 104-144.
44. Wis. STAT. § 766.56(4)(b). Paragraph (c) states: "A creditor is not subject to a
penalty under par. (b) if the creditor shows by a preponderance of the evidence that failure
to give notice was unintentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such error." Id. § 766.56(4)(c). The
UMPA does not contain a similar clause. See supra note 43.
45. 151 Wis. 2d at 479, 444 N.W.2d at 756.
46. Id. at 481-82, 444 N.W.2d at 757.
47. Id. at 478, 444 N.W.2d at 756.
48. See supra text accompanying note 43.
49. Park Bank-West, 151 Wis. 2d at 480,444 N.W.2d at 757. See also supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
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purpose obligations for which the marital estate was responsible"0 and
to allow the nonapplicant spouse to exercise rights such as termination
of the account to the extent of any unused granted credit."'
Concerning the nominal (i., $25) statutorily imposed liability for the
bank's failure to give notice to the nonapplicant spouse, the court
remarked: "Such a penalty sounds in absurdity, given the fact that
Sandra was denied an opportunity to protect her rights and interests. If
Sandra had known of the indebtedness, she could have objected to it, or
monitored the use of the funds, or participated in their repayment.
52
Concerned with the fact that a creditor could break the law by not giving
notice to the nonapplicant spouse and merely receive a slap on the wrist,
the court further stated: "The precedential implications of this decision
are clear, and we suggest a reevaluation of sec. 766.56(4), Stats., by the
legislature. 5 3  As of January 1996, the legislature has not amended
section 766.56(4).
Until this section is amended, a creditor can be lax in sending out the
notice mandated by the WMPA and still be protected because they are
not barred from collecting the debt against the marital community.
However, the nonapplicant spouse receives no protection for his or her
share of the marital community. Furthermore, regardless of the nominal
penalty imposed on creditors, the applicant spouse can easily intercept
the mail, in which case the nonapplicant spouse once again will not
receive notification of a family purpose obligation that can be satisfied
from the marital community.
III. THE WMPA COMPARED TO ARIZONA'S COMMUNITY PROP-
ERTY SYSTEM
Arizona has had a community property system in effect since 1865.' 4
Only a few statutes exist, but there is a wealth of common law interpret-
ing these statutes."5 Arizona's first community property statute was
based on California law. 6 Recently, however, Arizona courts have
50. Id. at 483, 444 N.W.2d at 758.
51. ld. See Wis. STAT. § 766.565 (1993-94). See also Weisberger & Wolek, supra note
24, at 72.
52. Park Bank-West, 151 Wis. 2d at 484, 444 N.W.2d at 758.
53. Id. at 485, 444 N.W2d at 759.
54. See generally John D. Lyons, Development of Community Property Law in Arizona,
in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW 3 (Jan P. Charmatz & Harriet S.
Daggett eds., 1977).
55. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-201, -211, -213 to -215, -217 (1995).
56. Lyons, supra note 54, at 7.
1996]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
stated that Arizona law is most similar to Washington community
property law.
57
Arizona Statutes section 25-211 states: "All property acquired by
either husband or wife during the marriage, except that which is acquired
by gift, devise or descent, is the community property of the husband and
wife."58 This statute creates a rebuttable presumption that all property
acquired during the marriage (with the stated exceptions) is community
property, regardless of whose name is on the title.59 The Arizona
Supreme Court has described the presumption as being nearly conclu-
sive.6°
Furthermore, Arizona has described the community of husband and
wife to be "'more analogous to a partnership than any other status
known to [their] laws."' 6' Arizona Revised Statutes section 25-214,
dealing with management and control, states: "The spouses have equal
management, control and disposition rights over their community
property, and have equal power to bind the community., 62  Although
allowing for equal management and equal power to bind, the statute
requires joinder of both spouses for certain transactions in order to bind
the community.
Section 25-214 further states:
Either spouse separately may acquire, manage, control or dispose
of community property, or bind the community, except that
joinder of both spouses is required in any of the following cases:
1. Any transaction for the acquisition, disposition or encum-
brance of an interest in real property other than an unpatent-
ed mining claim or a lease of less than one year.
57. Id.
58. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1995).
59. Lincoln Fire Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 88 P.2d 533, 534 (Ariz. 1939).
60. Arizona Cent. Credit Union v. Holden, 432 P.2d 276, 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
"This presumption may be overcome by proof that it was the intention of the spouses at the
time of acquisition that the property should be the separate property of one or the other."
Barnes, 88 P.2d at 534 (citing Jones v. Rigdon, 257 P. 639, 640 (Ariz. 1927)). The burden of
proof rests with the spouse claiming that the property acquired during the marriage is his or
her separate property, and this must be established by clear and satisfactory (convincing)
evidence. Barnes, 88 P.2d at 534 (citing Rundle v. Winters, 298 P. 929, 931 (Ariz. 1931)).
However, "where there is any doubt in the court's mind, the property will be treated as
community property." Holden, 432 P.2d at 279 (citing Tyson v. Tyson, 149 P.2d 674, 679
(Ariz. 1944)).
61. Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 423 P.2d 364, 367 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (quoting Ackel v.
Ackel, 110 P.2d 238, 242 (Ariz. 1941)).
62. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214(B) (1995).
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2. Any transaction of guaranty, indemnity or suretyship. 63
"[T]he plain language of section 25-214(C) 'requires that both spouses
must execute a guaranty in order to bind the community."' 64  The
Arizona Supreme Court "has found that the statute 'was intended to
protect both spouses' interest in their common property.""'6 Thus, even
though the marital community might have derived some benefits from
a transaction (e.g., husband only signs a guaranty binding partnership),
the marital community will not be liable for any debt if only one
spouse's signature appears on one of the transactions enumerated in the
statute for which joinder of both spouses is required.6 The Arizona
Statutes also address the liability of community and separate property for
community debts. "Community debts include those contracted by the
husband in furtherance of community affairs and by the wife for
necessaries for herself and her children during the marriage."'67 Section
25-215 provides:
Except as prohibited in § 25-214, either spouse may contract
debts and otherwise act for the benefit of the community. In an
action on such a debt or obligation the spouses shall be sued
jointly and the debt or obligation shall be satisfied: first, from the
community property, and second, from the separate property of
the spouse contracting the debt or obligation. I
Arizona's community property system allows both spouses equal
power to bind the marital community, but requires joinder before certain
obligations can be incurred for the benefit of the community. As
previously stated, all property acquired during marriage is presumed to
be community property. The name on the title is irrelevant. Thus, while
one spouse would be able to unilaterally enter into an obligation to
benefit the community by exhibiting all of the community property assets
for a creditworthiness evaluation, Arizona has further chosen to require
joinder for certain obligations in order to protect both spouses. If
Wisconsin had a similar joinder requirement for certain marital or family
63. Id § 25-214(C)(1)-(2).
64. First Interstate Bank of Ariz., N.A. v. Tatum and Bell Ctr. Assoc., 821 P.2d 1384,
1389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Consolidated Roofing & Supply Co. v. Grimm, 682 P.2d
457, 463 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)).
65. 1d& (quoting Geronimo Hotel & Lodge v. Putzi, 728 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Ariz. 1986)).
66. Id. "While there may be circumstances where a spouse may be estopped from
disaffirming a contract, we are constrained from adopting a rule which would preclude a
spouse from disaffirming any contract from which the community has received benefits." Id.
(quoting Grimm, 682 P.2d at 463).
67. Wine v. Wine, 480 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
68. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-215(D) (1995).
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purpose obligations, the nonapplicant spouse would receive protection
before the marital community became liable.
Two additional purposes are served by a joinder requirement. 9
First, joinder "establishes a moral basis for allocating lOSS. ' '7° Second,
"joinder ensures that any and all liable parties will have notice of the
obligation at the time it is incurred.",71 Under the WMPA, the nonap-
plicant spouse does not receive notice that he or she, and the marital
community, may be liable for a debt incurred by the applicant spouse
until after the obligation has been incurred. The unfairness to the
nonapplicant spouse is evident in such a situation.
In order for the judgment to be valid against the marital community,
Arizona Statutes section 25-215(D) requires both spouses to be sued
jointly on a community obligation.72 The requirements of Section 25-
215 have been described as "unique."'73 The WMPA's management and
control, spousal obligation, and creditors' rights and obligations
sections74 should be amended so that Wisconsin would follow the
Arizona community property system's model of requiring joinder of both
spouses for certain debts contracted for the benefit of the community.
This system would extend fairness not only to the creditors who will be
able to make claims against the community property of the spouses, but
also to the spouses themselves who will be able to protect their interests
in the community property.
IV. CONCLUSION
The WMPA has been successful in making marriage more akin to a
partnership. With certain exceptions, spouses now have equal access to
credit, as well as equal management and control of the marital communi-
ty. However, the WMPA has gone too far in protecting the rights of
creditors while leaving the rights of one or the other spouse almost
completely unprotected.
A joinder requirement for certain marital obligations would alleviate
69. Keith D. Ross, Note, Sharing Debts: Creditors and Debtors Under the Uniform
Marital Property Act, 69 MINN. L. REV. 111, 118 (1984).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 119.
72. Oyakawa v. Gillett, 854 P.2d 1212, 1217 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). "In Arizona, there
is no statute like California Civil Code section 5120.110, which gives notice to all married
persons that an action on a community obligation may proceed against one spouse and that
the resulting judgment binds the community of both spouses." Id. at 1216-17.
73. Id. at 1217.
74. See Wis. STAT. §§ 766.51, .55, .56 (1993-94). See supra part II.B.
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an unfair burden imposed on one of the spouses after the fact. In the
alternative, the Wisconsin legislature should consider requiring joinder
of the spouses for transactions above a certain dollar amount. At the
very least, the WMPA notice requirement that creditors are required to
give by law to the nonapplicant spouse when a marital or family
obligation is incurred should be amended so that the creditor receives a
greater penalty for a failure to execute the proper notice.
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